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The International Seminar was established in 1978, early enough to catch
the first wave of academic research stimulated by the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the shift in early 1973 to a flexible
exchange rate system. The point of departure for much of this research was
the distinction between a fixed exchange rate system like Bretton Woods, in
which inflation is transmitted from a large country like the U.S. to other
nations that are forced to import inflation unwillingly, and a flexible ex-
change rate system that allows individual nations to uncouple their inflation
rates and pursue independent monetary policies. In the paradigm presented
by such longtime advocates of flexible exchange rates as Milton Friedman,
nations with different degrees of aversion to inflation could go their separate
ways, and the exchange rates of the inflation-prone countries would steadily
and smoothly depreciate relative to the currencies of the inflation-averse
nations. And, while nominal exchange rates would change to reflect inflation
differentials between countries, real exchange rates would remain stable and
real trade would proceed unhampered by the jarring one-step devaluations
forced on inflation-prone countries that ran out of international reserves
under the Bretton Woods system.
However, the first few years after 1973 exposed a reality that contrasted
sharply with the paradigm of the flexible rate advocates. Exchange rates
turned out to be highly volatile, and since nominal exchange rates varied far
more than the inflation differential between countries, real exchange rates
were volatile as well. Far from insulating real trade flows and domestic real
activity from international monetary disturbances, the flexible exchange rate
system proved to be highly disruptive. The U.S. economy overheated in
1978-1979, partly in response to the weak dollar, while the 50 percent real
appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and early 1985 decimated U.S.
exports and U.S. manufacturing output, leading to the popular evocation of
the American industrial heartland as the 'rust belt'. Following 1985 the dollar
returned roughly to its 1980 level, and the cycle of expansion in exports and
manufacturing was repeated.
The volatility of real exchange rate movements provides the central theme
for Part II of this volume, as well as the setting for three other subsidiary
themes. First, the disruptive effects of real exchange rate volatility has led to
a search for intermediate exchange rate systems that combine the best212 Introduction to Part II
features of fixed and floating rates. Second, partly in response to the role of
U.S. fiscal deficits in the 1980-1985 appreciation of the dollar, the volatility
of real exchange rates has led to interest in using international policy
coordination as a substitute for, or as a part of, an intermediate exchange
rate system. Third, within Europe the formation in 1979 of the European
Monetary System (EMS) combined an ongoing political process toward
economic and monetary unification with a desire to move away from volatile
exchange rates at least part of the way toward the ultimate objective of a
common currency.
The first paper in Part II, 'The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parities
during the 1970s' by Jacob Frenkel, has become a classic statement of the
breakdown of the ideal Friedman paradigm in which exchange rate move-
ments would mainly reflect differential inflation rates. Frenkel calls attention
to the surprisingly loose relationship between price levels and exchange rates
during the first decade of floating. Not only did short-run changes in
exchange rates bear little relationship to short-run differentials in national
inflation rates, but also divergences from purchasing-power parities (PPP)
were cumulative.
Frenkel's empirical work contrasts the experience of the 1920s and 1970s
for the bilateral exchange rates between the dollar and the British pound,
French franc, and German mark (and also for various cross-rates among the
pound, franc, and mark). He finds that PPP held up relatively well in the
1921-1925 period and that policies which affected the trend of domestic
relative to foreign prices also changed the exchange rate in the appropriate
direction by roughly one-to-one. The results for 1973-1979 differ completely
- the slope coefficients relating exchange rate movements to inflation differ-
entials are often insignificant or wrong-signed, and the equations are unsta-
ble across variations in specification.
To explain these results, Frenkel argues that exchange rates, like other
asset prices, have been much more volatile than national price levels because
they are more sensitive to expectations about the future. Exchange rates are
forward looking, while national price levels are backward looking, due to the
sluggish adjustment of wages and prices. Thus, during periods that are
dominated by events that alter expectations, departures from PPP are likely
to be the rule rather than the exception. To explain the greater divergences
from PPP in the 1970s than in the 1920s, he points to the large number of
shocks that caused sharp changes in expectations, including the oil embargo,
supply shocks, commodity booms and shortages, shifts in the demand for
money, and differential productivity growth. In drawing policy implications
from his analysis Frenkel opposes policies of intervention in foreign exchange
markets that attempt to force exchange rates to conform to PPP levels, and
instead favors actions to minimize costly and unnecessary variations in
exchange rates through the adoption of more stable and predictable policies.Introduction to Part II 213
Theoretical work has pointed to exchange rate 'overshooting'as an impor-
tant component of real exchange rate volatility. Part of this theoretical
contribution is provided by Willem Buiter and Marcus Miller in the next
paper, 'Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and the Output Cost of Bringing
Down Inflation.' To understand the overshooting phenomenon, imagine that
country A and B initially have the same real interest rate, say 3 percent. Now
A shifts to a tighter monetary policy, boosting its interest rate to 6percent.
With international capital mobility, why would anyone hold the securities of
country B? This would occur only if the currency of A were expected to
depreciate by 3 percent per annum in the future. To achieve this, the A
currency must appreciate instantly at the time of the monetary tightening by
enough to achieve the expected depreciation in the future. If the 3percent
depreciation were expected to last for 10 years, for instance, thecurrency of
A would appreciate by 30 percent at the time of the policy shift, thus
overshooting its value based only on fundamentals like inflation differentials
(which are assumed to be zero in this example).
Buiter and Miller examine the implications of overshooting for the effects
of deflationary monetary policy, using the 1979-1981 strategy of the Thatcher
government as their main example. They stress that any appreciation of the
home currency subsequent to an announced reduction in monetary growth is
essentially due to the presence of non-classical rigidities in price andwage
determination. In the long run, the real exchange rate is independent of the
rate of monetary growth, that is, PPP holds. Any short-run appreciation thus
constitutes overshooting, and would not occur if prices andwages adjusted
instantaneously to the announced change in policy.
The link between the two parts of the BuiterMillerpaper, overshooting
and the output cost of bringing down inflation,comes about because an
exchange appreciation reduces the relative price of imports, and this actsto
reduce the inflation rate and raise the growth rate of real output forany
given growth rate of nominal output (just as woulda beneficial supply shock
like a bountiful harvest or reduction in the relative price of oil). However the
authors then provide a demonstration, which they support with rough quanti-
tative calculations based on U.K. parameters, that the additional reductionin
inflation obtained by a managed appreciation of the homecurrency is only a
transitory benefit. If it initially rises above its equilibrium level, the real
exchange rate must eventually return to that level, causing inflation to be
higher later than it otherwise would have been. The cumulative tradeoff
between inflation reduction and output loss is thus unaffected by the path of
the exchange rate. In all except timing, a stringent monetary policyso
designed as to leave the real exchange rate unaffected would have results
equivalent to those of a more dramatic unilateral policy.
Following the Frenkel analysis of the causes of real exchange rate volatil-
ity, and the BuiterMiller study of some of its effects,we turn to two types of214 Introduction to Part II
remedies, and these are intermediate exchange rate systems viewed from a
global perspective, and the specific workings and effects of the European
Monetary System. The third paper in this section by Marcus Miller and John
Williamson, 'The International Monetary System: An Analysis of Alternative
Regimes,' examines the relative implications for global price and output
stability of three systems. These are free floating, specific agreements to
stabilize nominal exchange rates (a proposal advocated by Ronald McKin-
non), and agreements to stabilize real exchange rates (as advocated by John
Williamson).
The analysis is conducted in the context of a simple Dornbusch-type,
symmetric, two-country world model. McKinnon's proposal is represented as
the fixing of nominal exchange rates and the targeting of the global price
level. Williamson's proposal is represented as fixing real exchange rates and
the use in each country of fiscal policy to target nominal income growth. In
both proposals the targeting of something other than the money supply is
aimed at the avoidance of shocks to velocity while retaining the monetarist
principle of controlling a nominal variable in order to avoid an acceleration
of inflation. Both stochastic disturbances are assumed, and the authors
analyze the steady-state variances of global prices and global output under
alternative systems. They make assumptions regarding the values of the
half-dozen parameters of the model and proceed to make numerical calcula-
tions of the resulting variances.
These calculations, summarized in Table 5 of their concluding section,
show that the effectiveness of the proposals depends on the nature of the
shocks. In the case of demand shocks the two proposals 'trade off' the
variances of prices and output, as the targeting of the price level by the
McKinnon proposal reduces the variance of the price level at the cost of a
higher output variance. The authors also show that a regime of free floating
with a money-supply target can closely approximate the price and output
variances of the McKinnon proposal. Obviously the latter conclusion depends
on the amount of overshooting that occurs with the particular model in a
free-floating regime; here the authors assume a minimal amount of over-
shooting.
In the next paper, 'The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline
and Central Bank Credibility,' Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano exam-
ine the effects on central bank behavior of a specific exchange-rate regime,
the fixed-rate European Monetary System (EMS). They set the stage for their
study by noting an asymmetry of the EMS, in which inflation-prone countries
periodically realign their currencies in order to counter the loss of competi-
tiveness caused by their high inflation rates. While one would expect in this
system movements of the real exchange rate between realignments, and then
a return of the real exchange rate to equilibrium upon realignment, in fact
the inflation-prone countries have not devalued sufficiently to restore theIntroduction to Part II 215
initial real exchange rate. Why, then, wouldan inflation-prone country join
the EMS if it is likely to imply a trend of real appreciationover time? The
authors argue that the answer must be the effect of the EMS on the
'incentive to inflate' of the monetary authority, which now must face the
consequences of a trend real appreciation that would not exist under freely
floating rates.
Giavazzi and Pagano treat the EMS exclusively as a form of precommit-
ment about macroeconomic policy. Adherence implies that the new entrant
agrees to raise inescapably the cost to itself of inflationary surprises by
denying itself the possibility of offsetting through currency depreciation the
loss of competitiveness which they imply. When the country is outside the
EMS on its own its monetary authority has an ill-starred incentive to reduce
the value of the public debt and raise output via unanticipated inflation. This
incentive is ill-starred, because the public knows it and therefore thwarts it
and also systematically raises its long-run expectation of inflation. By accept-
ing in advance to bear an additional cost of unanticipated inflation, the
monetary authority offsets this distortion, enhances its credibility, and thereby
lowers the effective cost of inflation reduction. The conditions under which
that calculus is favorable to joining the System are worked out ina small
model in which the monetary authority maximizes an objective function of
inflation and output, subject to the typical macroeconomic constraints ofan
open economy. The authors find that the result is often favorable to 'tying
one's hands.'
At the background of most theoretical explanations of exchange rate
volatility and overshooting is the assumption of perfect capital mobility. In
the final paper in this section Martin S. Feldstein in "Domestic Saving and
International Capital Movements in the Long Run and Short Run" raises
questions about the interplay between international capital mobility and the
autonomy of national macroeconomic policy. Are national capital markets so
thoroughly permeable that they can be regarded as indistinguishablesources
and uses of funds in a world market in which rates of returnare systemati-
cally equalized internationally? Or, on the contrary, is the flow of capitalas it
moves across national boundaries sufficiently viscous for changes in national
supply and demand to have persistent effects on national real interest rates?
Feldstein's paper emphasizes the long-run aspects of the question and
examines the implications of international capital mobility for medium-term
policies. If international capital flows were infinitely elastic, authorities in
small- and medium-sized coutnries could not increase the supply of funds for
national investment by any independent actions of their own. Only global
agreements in which all parties acted in concert could effectively increase the
supply of funds available for investment. In contrast, from the perspective of
a large country like the United States, perfect capital mobility acts as less of a
constraint on longrun policy, because its sources and uses of funds are sucha216 Introduction to Part II
large share of the total world supply and demand that, even acting alone, it
could substantially alter global market conditions. Perfect capital mobility
would nonetheless have important consequences for the United Sates, for it
would imply that national policies pursued by U.S. authorities have major,
direct consequences for the rest of the world and that feedback from the rest
of the world influences the way in which these policies bear their fruit.
In this paper Feldstein presents an array of tests of the hypothesis of
perfect international capital mobility based on cross-country differences of
national rates of saving and investment in seventeen OECD countries. He
develops a simple model of domestic saving, domestic investment, and net
foreign investment in an open economy in the long run, and shows that,
under certain circumstances, perfect capital mobility would imply zero corre-
lation across countries between national rates of saving and investment.
Using data on five-, ten- and twenty-year averages of these rates between
1960 and 1979, he then demonstrates that this correlation is closer to one
than to zero. Feldstein concludes that the evidence rejects the hypothesis of
perfect capital mobility and suggests that, in the post-OPEC period, a dollar
of sustained increase in domestic saving increased domestic investment in the
average OECD country by roughly 85 cents. The implication is that au-
tonomous changes in domestic policy matter, and, for instance, a move
toward a fiscal surplus directly increases the supply of national saving
available for investment and does not entirely spill over abroad in the form of
a reduction in foreign borrowing (or increase in foreign lending).
1
1The Feldstein approach is controversial, and his finding of minimal capital mobility from
evidence of highly correlated saving and investment rates seems to conflict with the widespread
belief that capital mobility is high and has been growing. For a set of references on more recent
work on this controversy, and an approach which measures the extent of capital mobility from
forward exchange rate data, see another ISOM paper not included in this volume by Jeffrey A.
Frankel and Alan T. MacArthur, 'Political vs. Currency Premia in International Real Interest
Differentials: A Study of Forward Rates for 24 Countries, "European Economic Review, Vol.
32, no. 5 (June 1988), pp. 1083-1114.